Mercantile Bombay: A Journey of Trade, Finance and Enterprise

 

Mercantile Bombay: A Journey of Trade, Finance and Enterprise

Mumbai has a deep legacy as an international financial hub from the 19th to early 20th century. It was the central node of trading communities in a globalised colonial world, the remnants of which are seen today. The author describes the city's heyday and advances the prospect of Bombay's revival as a global city of enterprise. This excerpt traces the history of the Bombay Burmah Trading Co., which played a role in the onset of the final Anglo-Burmese War.

By a twist of fate, The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd. is the holding company of Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. This makes it part of the Wadia group of companies; its chairman Nusli Wadia, is a direct descendant of the famed Wadia ship-builders family, known for their long association with teak timber.

The original trading corporation made its fortune in Burma teak. The company, which today has coffee and tea estates, and other manufacturing interests, was mainly a teak lumbering and trading entity in Burma in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Its merchant, William Wallace, was among the first loggers in the then pristine rainforests of Upper Burma (now a part of Myanmar). This Bombay company was also the trigger for the third and final Anglo-Burmese war (1885–1886) against Upper Burma. It was a war that gave Great Britain a monopoly over Burmese resources, particularly its much valued teakwood forests.

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd. was originally founded as Frith & Co (Bombay) in 1837, a partnership firm between a Bombay-based merchant Framji Nusservanji Patel and a Scotsman from Edinburg, J.G. Frith. The partnership firm largely dealt in Manchester piece goods (cloth); it was also an agent for the British Government of Ceylon for sourcing a variety of goods from the subcontinent and England. It changed its name to Wallace & Co. when the Scottish Wallace family became a partner.

The trading interests of this firm changed drastically when the oldest of the six Wallace brothers, William, visited Burma to oversee the supply of 1,500 tons of teakwood that had been contracted from a firm from Moulmein, Lower Burma. This supply was destined for Bombay and for work on the railways in India. William witnessed in the (by then British) southern Burmese provinces of Arakan, Pegu and Tenasserim in 1855, which had harbours on the rivers Irrawaddy, Sittang and Salween, respectively, a brisk trade in teak. These territories were already part of British ruled southern Burma after the conclusion of the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826) and the signing of the Treaty of Yandabo (24 February 1826) between the Burmese and English.

 

An indication of the scale of business in teak, which was by then needed to build the railways in India, provide for the shipyards, as well as supply exports to England and China, was a report of 1886 by Sir Dietrich Brandis, the first British conservator of Burma’s forests. He states that between the years 1857 and 1864, approximately 85,000 tons of teakwood was exported every year. And from 1883 to 1884, the annual average export was 275,000 tons (Pointon 1963). As the Lower Burma forests slowly depleted because of excessive logging by various companies that bought teak concessions (permissions), logging companies began looking north to the Upper Burmese kingdom. One of the earliest to make an inroad in acquiring logging concessions from King Mindon, and later from his son King Theebaw, was William Wallace.

These concessions were viewed as risky in Bombay by the partners of Wallace & Company. The Upper Burmese kingdom was totalitarian (which meant that contracts could be rescinded on a whim), and the still simmering friction with British-ruled southern Burma made large investments in North Burmese teak concessions financially risky. To minimise this risk, the partnership firm of Wallace & Co. floated a new company – The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation – this way, it could monetise William’s investments in Burma. This company was incorporated on 4 September 1863, and William Wallace’s risky Burma ventures were acquired by it in 1864. The time coincided with the share market boom of 1863–1865 in Bombay, which was fuelled by money pouring into the city due to the demand for Indian cotton. The American Civil War (1861–1865) had led to an embargo on exports of American cotton from the southern American states, which starved England’s textile mills of raw cotton. Bombay’s hinterland of present-day south Gujarat and former Maratha territories (by then under Bombay Presidency), including the cotton growing tracts of present-day Karnataka, made the city the transhipment port for the export of the coarser short staple Deccan cotton to England.

But in just 20 years after its incorporation, the Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation found itself mired in an international ‘incident’ at the Tinsel Court of King Theebaw at Mandalay (Upper Burma). It was fined Rs. 22 lakhs by the Hutlaw (Imperial Council), which believed the company had logged more than it had paid for. This contentious claim between the Hutlaw and a British Indian company came at an opportune time. Sir Winston Churchill, in his biography of Sir Randolph Churchill, his father and secretary of state for India (June 1885-January 1886), referred to the Hutlaw’s contentious claim as the ‘lucky incident’ that gave Great Britain the excuse to invade Upper Burma in the Third and final Anglo-Burmese War (1885–1886) (Pointon 1963). Incidentally, King Theebaw, Queen Supalayat and their family were exiled in Ratnagiri, a coastal district south of Bombay islands, then part of its Presidency. In a moving tribute to the exiled Burmese royal family in her book The King In Exile: The Fall Of The Royal Family Of Burma, author Sudha Shah describes how the exiled King Theebaw spent his last days observing through his telescope ships moving past the coast of Ratnagiri, evidently to and from Bombay. Little did the exiled King realise that the port city of Bombay was by then the axis for security, commerce and culture in the western Indian Ocean, and the reason for his downfall.

Burma teak was an important part of the valuable Bombay–China trade, whose better-known goods were cotton and Malwa opium. It was the China trade – often used as a euphemism for the highly lucrative but illegal (in China) opium trade – that not only brought great wealth to Bombay and its merchants but also ruined many a Bombay family fortune in the aftermath of the First Opium War (1839–1842)

The Indo-Pacific opportunity in 2022

 

Nine great powers and a number of important multilaterals have vested interests in the Indo-Pacific. Given the U.S.-China standoff in the region, the role of new groupings like the Quad and AUKUS is significant. The time is ripe for India to use its position in the region, and convert its humanitarian duties into economic and strategic opportunities in 2022.

BY ANKUR YADAV

“Yesterday is a foreign country — tomorrow belongs to us,” stated Thabo Mbeki, former president of South Africa, in 1998. Never was this truer than for 2020 and 2021, which experienced globally transformational events. And nowhere more than in the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific, which is changing at multiple gears and levels. As it moves into 2022, the region will carry the imprint of the past five years, and will have to chart a course through inter-state tensions and crises, using both diplomacy and military preparedness.

The region is central to world economy and peace, and nine countries are key players: the U.S., China, Japan, India, Germany, the UK, Russia, Australia and France. The geopolitics and geo-economics of the Indo-Pacific will be largely shaped by the interplay of relations among these nations.

Of paramount importance is the U.S.-China equation. As the Trump era ended last January, there was uncertainty over whether the next president would be tough or soft on China. President Joe Biden has demonstrated, in his first year, his formula of firmness, resilience and civil discourse. Expect this relationship to be marked by continually adversarial, competitive and cooperative traits.

Differences over Beijing’s south/east China policy, aggressive postures towards Taiwan, human rights violations in Xinjiang, the subjugation of Hong Kong’s citizenry and assertive economic outreach in the Indo-Pacific — these will weigh heavily on U.S.-China relations. Through its active diplomacy — a series of high official visits starting with Vice-president Kamala Harris — and reaffirming commitments to treaty allies and partners alike, the U.S. signalled it is here to stay. However, it wants the full engagement of its friends to create integrated deterrence and will keep the doors of dialogue open to Beijing. In contrast, Chinese President Xi Jinping, armed with unprecedented authority at home, has been confrontational, as seen in China’s repeated incursions into Taiwan’s air defence zone and the PLA’s obduracy in eastern Ladakh.

In this standoff, the role of new groupings and individual nations is significant. Foremost are the Quad, a strategic partnership between the U.S., India, Japan and Australia and the militaristic AUKUS (Australia, UK, U.S.). Together, they have arrested the perception of China’s regional ascendency. In 2022, the effort to curb China’s influence can gain further momentum if Japan under prime minister Kishida Fumio announces a bold National Security Strategy (NSS), doubles its defence budget and makes a serious effort to amend Article 9 (which limits the use of its defence forces), thereby expanding military cooperation with the U.S. Meanwhile, India and Australia are on track to deepen ties, not only bilaterally but also with the other two Quad powers. The next Quad summit, probably hosted by Japan, will cement the grouping.

Two regional groupings — the EU and ASEAN — can determine how they situate themselves in the Quad-China interaction. The EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, announced last September, aims at increasing its economic and security profile in, and linkages with, the region. The new government in Germany and the April 2022 presidential elections in France will shape the EU’s policy towards this distant region. Only by being more strategic and less mercantilist, more candid and assertive with China, and more cooperative with partners such as India, can the EU — and its former member the UK — hope to become vital players in the Indo-Pacific.

ASEAN, located in the middle of the Indo-Pacific waters, faces the heat of China’s aggression and the sharpening great power rivalry. Its unity is under stress and its centrality is under question. This group has the most work to do. It must enhance its realism and shed its tendency of wishing away problems. Some plain-speaking by the Quad powers with ASEAN governments is necessary; an opportunity will be available when President Biden holds an in-person summit with the ten ASEAN leaders soon.

The outcome of three major summits in 2022 — G7, BRICS, G20 — will also impact the politics and diplomacy of the region. Germany, as host of the G7 this year, will need to assess if the G7’s 2021 “Build Back Better World” pledge has made any headway in Asia. It now has to cope with not one but two adversaries: China and Russia. All eyes will be on whether Prime Minister Narendra Modi attends the 14th BRICS summit, to be hosted in China. It’s an unlikely prospect unless Beijing shows sufficient accommodation to end the impasse in Ladakh. The G20 summit, to be hosted by Indonesia, will reveal whether the depth of Indonesian diplomacy and capabilities of president Joko Widodo make him a star statesman.

Where, then, does India stand in these swirling Indo-Pacific waters? India has three key obligations. First, to strengthen the Quad – especially by ensuring that the grouping fulfils its commitment to deliver at least one billion vaccine doses to Indo-Pacific nations by December 2022. Simultaneously, India must protect its established relationship with Russia, and show some resilience in dialogue with Beijing. Second, it must enhance cooperation with key Southeast Asian partners —Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines and Thailand — while humouring ASEAN as a grouping. Third, the eastern and southern planks of Africa and the Indian Ocean island states need continued high policy attention and financial resources. A clear economic and trade agenda, involving and incentivising corporate India to follow the flag in this vital region, is certain to yield long-term dividends.

India has done well by fulfilling its humanitarian duties during the pandemic. Learning how to convert them smartly into economic and strategic opportunities in its periphery is the focused task for the natinal 2022.

Khalistan separatist propaganda continues

 

Khalistan separatist propaganda continues

India’s ban on the separatist group Sikhs for Justice helps to conceal what they really mean by “justice.” SFJ's continuing firehose of publicity shows no interest in the human rights of the thousands of innocents who died in Khalistani terrorist attacks during the 1980s and '90s. Quite the contrary.

BY ANKUR YADAV

Ominous threats against two Chief Ministers. A close-up simulating one being shot in the face. A “bounty” offered for an Indian Army general facing assassination. And applause for a terrorist who slaughtered hundreds of innocent civilians.

For Indian viewers, these are a few of the surprises — which should not be surprises at all — obscured by the Indian government’s ban on the U.S.-based separatist group Sikhs for Justice (SFJ). Fronted by an energetic American lawyer, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, who is officially labelled a terrorist in India, SFJ has been fighting through the ban and the pandemic to finally begin voting in its unofficial referendum on a breakaway Sikh state called Khalistan.

The timing of the initial vote in London — on the anniversary of Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984 — was not accidental, and it gives a clue to what Indians are not seeing because of the ban on Sikhs for Justice.

The group was branded an illegal organisation in January 2020, when a government order was ratified by Chief Justice D.N. Patel of the Delhi High Court. Justice Patel ruled that SFJ’s activities “threaten the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of India.” Dozens of SFJ websites were blocked in India and Pannun himself was declared an “individual terrorist.”

That didn’t stop SFJ celebrating the assassination of Prime Minister Gandhi, who was gunned down by two Sikh bodyguards on October 31^st, 1984. Both assassins are frequently featured in SFJ propaganda, hailed as “martyrs” and honoured for their “brave act of justice.”

But that’s just a part of the constant celebration of murder that is evident — to those outside India — in the stream of internet propaganda emitted by Sikhs for Justice, on multiple sites and platforms. In fact, although it describes itself as a “human rights organisation,” SFJ’s firehose of publicity shows no glimmer of interest in the human rights of the thousands of innocents who died in Khalistani terrorist attacks during the 1980s and early ’90s. Quite the contrary.

Prominently featured as a hero in the referendum campaign, for example, is the worst mass-murderer in Canadian history — the Babbar Khalsa leader, Talwinder Singh Parmar. It was Parmar who conceived and directed the 1985 Kanishka bomb plot which destroyed Air India’s Flight 182 off the coast of Ireland — the deadliest terrorist attack anywhere until 9/11. Parmar later fled Canada for Pakistan and was killed by police in Punjab in 1992 — so he never faced trial. But a decade of legal proceedings in Canada – including a judicial inquiry and a criminal trial of Parmar’s colleagues — confirmed that Parmar instigated and directed the bomb plot.

None of the 331 victims had anything to do with the Khalistan struggle. Eighty of them were children. Thirty-three were Sikhs. Two were Japanese baggage handlers, killed by a second bomb which blew up on the ground as it was being transferred to another Air India flight leaving Tokyo. The plan was to destroy two planes at once, on opposite sides of the globe – meaning that the death toll, as ghastly as it was, was supposed to be much higher.

Even so, the Kanishka massacre was a catastrophe not just for the victims, who were mainly Indo-Canadians heading for vacations in India, but also for the Khalistan movement, which never recovered from the disgrace. How was a massacre of Canadians supposed to bring forth a Sikh state? If this was “revenge” for the 1984 Indian attack on the Golden Temple, why kill Canadian Sikhs? Or vacationing children? Or Japanese baggage handlers?

Nevertheless, instead of repudiating this historic crime, the Sikhs for Justice campaign seems to embrace it. In December 2019, Gurpatwant Pannun was in British Columbia to promote his referendum by announcing the opening of the “Shaheed Talwinder Singh Parmar Voter Registration Centre.” To mark the occasion, two posters showing Parmar in heroic poses were prepared and posted on the internet.

“Martyr” poster of Air India bomber Talwinder Singh Parmar, fixed to the exterior of the Dasmesh Darbar gurudwara in Surrey, British Columbia. The same photo, taken at a Pakistani gun market in 1989, was used by Sikhs for Justice to advertise its “Shaheed Talwinder Singh Parmar Voter Registration Centre.”

More portraits of a beaming Parmar were featured in street demonstrations at the Indian consulate in Vancouver. No explanation was offered for why Parmar was being honoured as a martyred hero. But, for local Khalistanis, no explanation was needed. A life-size poster of “Shaheed” Parmar already adorned a gurudwara in nearby Surrey, British Columbia. The excuse typically offered for this grotesque display is that, despite abundant evidence that he led the bomb plot, Parmar was somehow innocent. As for why he ordered the bombs, and why those were the bombs that blew up, and why he preached that “Indian planes will fall from the sky,” Parmar’s admirers are silent.

So, the glorification of Parmar was already normalised in Canada, and no controversy arose when Sikhs for Justice made him, quite literally, the poster boy for its referendum campaign.

This reverence for a mass-murderer, though, had been a feature of the Khalistan movement ever since Parmar’s death in 1992. Various SFJ Facebook pages applaud him as a “Jathedar,” or religious leader, and show him posing with weapons at a gun market in Pakistan.

Parmar is not, however, the only terrorist who is regularly honoured in Sikhs for Justice iconography. Pannun has recently produced and starred in two menacing videos aimed at the former and current Chief Ministers of Punjab – Capt. Amarinder Singh and Charanjit Singh Channi – both staunch opponents of the Khalistan movement. The first video, entitled “I Am Dilawar,” was released on the anniversary of a 1995 suicide bombing by Dilawar Singh, who killed Chief Minister Beant Singh, along with sixteen bystanders. Illustrated with grim scenes of the wreckage of Beant Singh’s car, the video features closeups of a portrait of Capt. Amarinder being shot in the face by an off-screen gunman. Any crackdown on Khalistanis, the video warns, will have consequences – perhaps the same fate that befell Beant Singh: “Capt. Amarinder is following the footsteps of slain CM Beant.”

More recently, after the resignation of Capt. Amarinder, Pannun shifted his aim to his successor as Chief Minister of Punjab, Charanjit Channi. Again, the video thunders a warning, leaning heavily on reminders of the murder of CM Beant Singh, with pictures of the victim and the wreckage of his car to reinforce the message.

Such videos are posted and re-posted on a sprawling network of websites and Facebook pages which animate a frenetic game of whack-a-mole, as Indian authorities manage to shut one down, only to see another pop up in its place. This allows a page to run Sikhs for Justice material for years, linking to an SFJ home page and using the SFJ name and logo, only to be disowned as unofficial if trouble arises.

But wherever the content appears, the veneration of terrorist martyrs is a constant. In yet another video, Pannun shakes his finger at the camera and promises to give new iPhones to anyone who flies the Khalistan flag in honour of “Shaheed” Beant Singh, one of the bodyguards who shot Mrs. Gandhi.

An illustration of the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The same drawing was used by Sikhs for Justice to illustrate a Facebook posting applauding the assassins for their “brave act of justice.”

Other SFJ offerings illustrate Gurpatwant Pannun’s penchant for wild exaggeration. Operation Blue Star, for example, is a key moment in the history of the Khalistan movement, when Sikhs around the globe were outraged by the Indian Army’s June 1984 attack on the Golden Temple at Amritsar. Contemporary eyewitness accounts tell of the deaths of many soldiers, of the militant Sikh preacher, Jarnail Bhindranwale, and of his gunmen, as well as hundreds of innocent pilgrims. 37 years later, though, Gurpatwant Pannun frequently claims that ten thousand pilgrims were “herded” into the temple to be slaughtered by Indian troops.

Pannun also offers ominous “bounties” for information on notable enemies of the Khalistan movement, such as the military leaders of Operation Blue Star. Lt. Gen. Kuldip Brar, for example, has been an assassination target ever since and his throat was slashed by a Khalistani gang in 2012 during a trip to London. He survived, but remained a target, as seen in a Sikhs for Justice offer to pay handsomely for information on his movements.

A June 2021 offer by Sikhs for Justice to pay $250,000 for information about the travel plans of army officers involved in the 1984 army attack on the Golden Temple.

Another unnerving feature of SFJ’s online campaign is its use of the Air India bombing anniversary on June 23. What kind of mind commemorates that atrocity by denouncing Air India? Yet that’s exactly what happened in 2015, when Sikhs for Justice demanded a boycott of the airline.

An equally macabre commemoration came in 2021, when SFJ urged striking farmers to “seize Delhi airport” to mark the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.

Despite such provocative content, Sikhs for Justice has exploited Facebook’s willingness to keep its internet presence alive in the face of the Indian government’s attempts to suppress it. Indeed, Gurpatwant Pannun has used it as a kind of rhetorical flame-thrower – so much so that it hardly seemed surprising when he celebrated the start of referendum voting in 2021 by taking a real flame-thrower to the Indian flag.

India’s internet censorship, then, has been far from leak-proof when it comes to Facebook. But it’s been more successful on Twitter, where there are many accounts offering a Khalistani perspective but reaching small numbers of followers. There’s been no enduring presence for leading figures like Pannun, whose accounts are quickly shuttered. Even so, they are revealing when they briefly appear.

Pannun made such an appearance for a couple of weeks in 2021, for example, in another bid to exploit the anniversary of the Air India bombing.

Using an account purpose-built for the occasion, Pannun posted a series of extraordinary tweets incorporating his signature colourful graphics and video. These displayed a letter to Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, demanding the expulsion of the Indian High Commissioner to Canada, Ajay Bisaria, for what Pannun called “hate-mongering speech against Canadian Sikhs.”

Pannun’s objection was to a routine annual statement by the High Commissioner marking the June 23 anniversary of the Air India bombing. In it, Bisaria made no mention of Sikhs, Canadian or otherwise. Rather, he noted that the attack “revealed to the world the heavy cost that Khalistani terrorism could inflict on humanity.”

That was the comment that Pannun underlined in his protest letter to Prime Minister Trudeau. But what, exactly, was improper about deploring Khalistani or any other kind of terrorism? Pannun’s letter did little to dispel that mystery. Rather, he compounded it by calling the statement an attempt by Bisaria to “delegitimise and undermine” the Khalistan movement.

Inevitably, his critics countered that it was the terrorism which damaged the movement, not the condemnation of terrorism.

An extract from Pannun’s letter to Prime Minister Trudeau, showing the Indian High Commissioner’s annual statement on the anniversary of the Kanishka bombing.

It would appear, then, that the Indian blackout on Pannun’s online campaign is succeeding to some extent – that is, assuming that blacking it out means success. But censorship also works against the censor, by sheltering the odious features of the campaign from public scrutiny. If Indians were more aware of Pannun’s threats and his soft spot for terrorists, it is hard to imagine him gaining in popular esteem.

More to the point, it seems unlikely that the millions of Sikhs who voted in 2017 for Capt. Amarinder will now be inspired by the sight of his simulated assassination to join the separatist camp. It is hardly a safe assumption that Pannun’s bellicose propaganda would win him new friends if not kept out of sight. In the light of day, it seems far more likely to win him new enemies.

For most of the world, though, the Sikhs for Justice referendum campaign is barely visible – a mere curiosity in the backwaters of the internet. It is simply not news – although it might be if it were banned in the West, not just in India. For Canada, Britain and the U.S., freedom of speech is the rule and there’s been no effort to silence SFJ. Although this irritates Indian authorities, Western politicians do not pay any price for tolerating speech which voters hardly notice.

Rather, what is missing in the West is not Indian-style censorship, but loud and public disapproval by political and community leaders. They also have freedom of speech – but they rarely use it, even to denounce the veneration of Talwinder Parmar in Canada, where some key electoral districts hang in the balance. Traditional vote-bank politics leads all parties to avoid even mild criticism of Khalistani propaganda.

Ramesh Sangha, a Sikh and a former Liberal Member of Parliament from Brampton, Ontario, knows that deviations from this practice are punished. In January of 2021, after alleging Khalistani sympathies on the part of two Sikh ministers in Prime Minister Trudeau’s cabinet, Sangha was swiftly booted out of the ruling Liberal party. Meanwhile, the New Democratic Party (NDP), a left-wing party which currently holds the balance of power in Canada’s parliament, is led by Jagmeet Singh, a lifelong Sikh activist who, upon winning the party leadership, famously refused to denounce the martyr posters honouring Parmar.

There is little prospect, then, that the gusher of Sikhs for Justice publicity will be shut off outside the borders of India. Within India, though, it is reasonable to wonder if the ban just protects Indians from what they might be better off knowing.

Categories: America, Articles, Asia , Canada , Europe, India , International Security , Issues, North America , Publications, Regions, Terrorism & Military Affairs , United Kingdom , United States , Western Europe
Tags: Indian ban, Indira Gandhi, khalistani movement, Separatists, sikh separatism, Sikhs for Justice

TAGGED UNDER: Indian ban, Indira Gandhi, khalistani movement, Separatists, sikh separatism, Sikhs for Justice

The legacy of India’s first CDS

General Bipin Rawat served as India's first Chief of Defence Staff, the top rank in the Indian military. His achievements in this pioneering role were many, but most significant was his initiation of structural reforms in the armed forces and indigenisation of military equipment.

BY Ankur yadav

The tragic helicopter crash on December 8 which claimed the lives of India’s Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Bipin Rawat, his wife, and 12 other military officers and personnel has sent India into deep mourning. Appointed as India’s first CDS on 31 December 2019, Rawat significantly impacted the Indian military by initiating deep structural reforms.

He was instrumental in shaping a joint combat posture for the Indian military and promoted the indigenisation of military equipment to reduce India’s long and costly dependency on imports. His blunt approach certainly ruffled feathers in the civilian and military establishment, but his was a sincere desire to bring about reforms that went against the military’s status-quo-ist approach.

The creation of the position of CDS was long pending. The Kargil Review Committee set up after the Kargil conflict in 1999 had recommended the creation such a post to provide single-point professional military advice to the political leadership.[1] But successive governments could not make headway due to turf wars between the three services over the post.[2] Ultimately, in 2019, the Modi government was able to overcome the differences and created the position of the CDS with the rank of a four-star general.[3] Unlike other countries, in India, the CDS is a political appointee – where seniority and government’s confidence in the appointee matters. This meant Rawat had the political leadership’s trust and mandate to initiate the much-needed military reforms related to tri-service integration and coordination, and equipment acquisition.

This General Rawat did relentlessly, pushing for jointness in the Indian military as his central mandate. He understood that future fifth-generation wars will be asymmetric and fought across entire spectrums, including land, air, sea, cyber, information, and economies. This was a big step up from the three services’ current siloed approach, with underutilisation of resources.

General Rawat aligned India with U.S. and Chinese militaries by setting up five theatre commands to combine army, air force, and naval assets and create joint combat capability. Once operationalised, these commands will replace the current 17 service-specific commands.[4] Rawat had to specifically work through stiff resistance from the Navy and Air Force to form the theatre commands.

It has paid dividends. India now has extensive coordination between the three services, visible during the border stand-off with China in eastern Ladakh since mid-2020. The Army and Air Force pressed into service their assets like the Akash missile system and Su-30 fighter aircraft during the long stand-off, and the Navy deployed gunboats and P8I maritime patrol aircraft for surveillance at Pangong Tso.[5] [6]

A critical element of jointness that General Rawat accomplished was the operationalisation of Joint Logistics Nodes in Mumbai, Guwahati, and Port Blair.[7] The facilities provide integrated logistics services to the military and have optimised human and financial resources and built interoperability among the three services through shared transport, supplies, and engineering support.

Rawat embarked on defence indigenisation by prioritising the weapons and platforms needed immediately, and in the long term for future joint capabilities. This is where he emphasised indigenous equipment, believing that India could not fight wars on the ‘borrowed strength’ of foreign equipment.[8] The services could, in the meanwhile, buy foreign equipment to meet immediate operational requirements but plan for fulfilling medium and long-term requirements through domestic capability, even hand-holding the domestic defence manufacturers to fulfil the three services’ requirements. S. P. Shukla, Group President, Agri, Defence & Aero Sectors of Mahindra and Vice President of the Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers appreciated Rawat’s support “for making India self-reliant in defence manufacturing” and “in building the capacity of the industry”.[9] Companies like Tata Advanced Systems (aerospace), Larson & Toubro (naval systems), Mahindra Defence (land systems) and Kalyani Group (small arms and land systems) have expanded their participation in the defence sector capitalising on the opportunities opened by the Aatmanirbhar Bharat initiative. Some have also collaborated with the foreign players to export sub-systems and become part of the global supply chain.

Naturally Rawat ran up against the powerful vested interests and ‘import lobby’ of middlemen who for decades thrived on commissions and kickbacks from arms imports. From Bofors guns to AgustaWestland helicopters, these created scandal after scandal, until Rawat began to push them back despite their many attempts to discredit him. The preparation and announcement of a ‘negative list’ that banned the import of 101 weapons and platforms in August 2020 is a sign of his successful efforts for indigenisation.[10] His goal was to make India an exporter of defence equipment.[11]

The new CDS will have to follow through with these reforms with vigour and independence. The immediate task will be to keep up the momentum of the theatre commands and sharpen joint combat capabilities, in addition to evolving a consensus among the three services for an integrated view on developing future tech capabilities for the military. General Rawat laid the foundation for his successor to continue the tough reforms needed to prepare India for old and new global challenges.

[1] Group of Ministers; Report On “Reforming The National Security System””, Press Information Bureau, 23 May 2001, https://archive.pib.gov.in/archive/releases98/lyr2001/rmay2001/23052001/r2305200110.html

[2] Xerxes Adrianwalla, “Chief of defence staff: executive chief or staff officer?”, Gateway House, 22 August 2019, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/chief-of-defence-staff/

[3] Cabinet, “Cabinet approves creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff in the rank of four star General”, Press Information Bureau, 24 December 2019, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1597425

[4] Ajai Shukla, “CDS General Bipin Rawat reveals shape of India’s ‘joint theatre commands’”, Business Standard, 15 September 2021, https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/cds-general-bipin-rawat-reveals-shape-of-india-s-joint-theatre-commands-121091501662_1.html

[5] Shishir Gupta, “India sending high-powered boats to match heavier Chinese vessels while patrolling Ladakh lake”, Hindustan Times, 1 July 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-sending-high-powered-boats-to-match-heavier-chinese-vessels-while-patrolling-ladakh-lake/story-FZSNWwepM10bzGg0CoXGIJ.html

[6] Manjeet Negi, “Navy’s P-8Is deployed in Ladakh; MiG-29K jets to move to air bases in North amid India-China border row”, India Today, 22 July 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-border-row-navy-p-8is-deployed-ladakh-mig-29k-jets-move-air-bases-north-1703040-2020-07-22

[7] Ministry of Defence, “CDS General Bipin Rawat operationalises Joint Logistics Node in Mumbai”, Press Information Bureau, 1 April 2021, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1708998  

[8] PTI, “India’s Aspiration to Become Regional Power Can’t Rely on Borrowed Strength: CDS Bipin Rawat”, News18, 27 August 2021, https://www.news18.com/news/india/indias-aspiration-to-become-regional-power-cant-rely-on-borrowed-strength-cds-bipin-rawat-4135613.html  

[9] Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers (@SIDMIndia), “Mr SP Shukla, Vice-President, SIDM~SIDM is honoured to have the support of Gen Bipin Rawat, CDS for making India self-reliant in #DefenceManufacturing. SIDM stands resolute in building the capacity of the Industry for a ‘#atmanirbhar’ India @DefProdnIndia @adgpi @SpokespersonMoD,” Twitter Tweet, July 10, 2020, https://twitter.com/SIDMIndia/status/1281431478191009792.

[10] Ministry of Defence, “MoD’s big push to Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative”, Press Information Bureau, 9 August 2020, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1644570

[11] Rajat Pandit, “India’s wars have to be won with Indian solutions: Gen Bipin Rawat”,

Top

1. 
   

Russia-India: Still a strategic partnership?

The two nations should take a clear-eyed review of the current state of their ties with an emphasis on intensifying dialogue in the new sectors.

BY Ankur yadav

After almost two years in the making, the meeting between Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi was held on 6 December 2021 in New Delhi. The Russian President’s visit was anticipated as never before, since the absence of personal meetings at the leadership level turned out to be critical for bilateral ties moving forward. Only when leaders meet, the relationship may receive an impetus with the existing misunderstandings being downplayed. Chances are high that both leaders will remain in office beyond 2024, so it is increasingly likely that for this decade, the relationship will hinge on their decision-making and personal diplomacy. Hence, the summit should be examined not only as another annual event, but from a strategic perspective.

Realignment of regional interests

This year’s meeting was unusual as it was complemented by a new mechanism – the 2+2 dialogue of foreign and defence ministers. The new track of interaction at the ministerial level has paid off. Setting up the 2+2 dialogue allowed for an exchange of views and concerns on topical regional issues such as Afghanistan, Iran, Syria and even the Indo-Pacific and seemingly facilitated the exploration of convergences in Central Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean region.

Undoubtedly, China and the United States were, albeit invisible and unmentioned, an essential part of the discussion as Moscow and New Delhi view regional and world affairs through the prism of their equations with these two great powers. Both Russian and Indian sides managed to flag their apprehensions of China’s and the U.S.’s activities in the region. Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh highlighted[1] “militarisation and expansion of armament in [India’s] neighbourhood” and “completely unprovoked aggression” on its northern border as a major challenge while Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov shared[2] with his Indian counterparts an apprehension of the U.S. “Indo-Pacific strategies” and the emergence of AUKUS alliance.

Judging by the remarks following the talks, regional issues figured prominently in the discussions. In particular, the new iteration of the Afghan crisis has prompted the two sides to keep together. After a series of consultations held in the last three months among national security advisers and diplomatic representatives, Moscow and New Delhi managed to come up with a similar view of developments in Afghanistan. The joint statement issued after the summit indicates[3] that India and Russia share major concerns about the security and political situation in Afghanistan and its wider implications for the region. Both stand for “the inclusive and representative government” and against Afghanistan turning into “a safe haven” for global terrorism. Other examples of similar views are approaches toward the resolution of the Syrian crisis and “the earliest reinvigoration of JCPOA.”

Defence: The pillar and the problem

Apart from certain progress in cooperation over global and regional issues, new agreements in other areas of bilateral ties have been reached. Interestingly, the achievements of the defence partnership – the fundamental pillar of the whole relationship – were presented in a low-key manner. Beyond the most-talked-about delivery of S-400 surface-to-air missile systems to India, officials also announced a new program for military-technical cooperation for 2021–2031 and the contract for production of AK-203 assault rifles through a joint venture company.

Surprisingly, the long-pending Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement (RELOS), discussed since 2018, “has been put off[4] for some time”, although its necessity for the Armed Forces was pointed out in the joint statement.

More interaction in military-technical cooperation appears to be hidden in the shadows. There are hints[5] that the discussions underway include the licensed production in India of Russian Igla-S man-portable air-defence systems and additional 50 SU-30MKI fighters. Some of the previously signed deals have seen[6] implementation recently with the frigate of 11356 class launch at the Yantar shipyard in Kaliningrad in late October 2021. The lease of one or even two SSN submarines from Russia is now also under negotiation as the primary option for the Indian Navy to keep up its underwater capabilities. Even though the dynamics of bilateral military-technical cooperation seem to have slowed down, the portfolio of deals on the table points to the enduring strategic nature of the relationship.

The issue of U.S. sanctions under Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) should be still factored in, even though it has been dismissed by the Russian officials on numerous occasions and disregarded by New Delhi in its decision to go ahead with purchases from black-listed Russian entities. New Delhi will have to keep its head on a swivel while dealing with the Russian defence sector as Washington does not appear predisposed to grant it a permanent waiver. U.S. authorities may possibly turn a blind eye to the S-400 deal, but would they bear to live with India’s other high-end defence acquisitions from Russia? Explaining to Washington that Russian-origin equipment is utilised against India’s main adversary – China – would scarcely be accepted as an excuse in the long run. Moreover, if the U.S. let India get away with imports from Russia, the whole CAATSA regime against Russia would be deemed futile.

It will be interesting to see how India manages to maintain its military cooperation with Russia in the future against the backdrop of the threat of sanctions. Obviously, CAATSA has become a wrinkle not only for Russia and India, but for the United States itself who needs to come up with a face-saving settlement allowing not to antagonize India, but at the same time to act within the law.

How to address the Indo-Pacific

The major current geopolitical divergence is varying visions of the Indo-Pacific region having emerged as a new forefront of political and economic activity on the one side and regional competition on the other. After an unpleasant hiccup[7] last year, Moscow and New Delhi seem to have brought under control their differing views on the issue, which does not mean, though, that they are on the same page.

At the press-conference, Sergey Lavrov spoke of[8] “identical positions with Indian colleagues” and promised to “do everything […] to prevent the plans of Indo-Pacific strategies, AUKUS and other closed (bloc) formats from trying to prevail over ASEAN and ASEAN-centric structures”. India wholeheartedly supports ASEAN-centrality as well. So do the United States and other nations that have come up with their own Indo-Pacific visions. Yet, New Delhi has resorted to a nuanced stance vis-à-vis AUKUS – it has neither endorsed, nor criticized this agreement while continuing to analyse what benefits it could extract from the emerging situation.

Different naming of the region – Asia-Pacific vs. Indo-Pacific – is just the tip of the iceberg. At the core of divergent perspectives lie different threat perceptions that ultimately impede enhanced regional engagement. The change in respective assessments of the major elephant in the room is not in the offing. However, it should not prevent Russia and India from seeking avenues for mutually beneficial cooperation in transport, infrastructure and other economic projects.

Even though Russia’s opposition to U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific is likely to stay unchanged for a while, it is possible for Moscow to narrow down its differences with other regional perspectives. As Russia’s dialogue with ASEAN countries, and Vietnam in particular, shows that Moscow is ready[9] to “explore promising areas of interaction” in the framework of ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outlook. India’s vision, as should be well realised in Moscow, does not contradict Russian convictions and leaves much space for engagement in a wide range of spheres. By making an exception from its stance and embracing India’s Indo-Pacific vision, Russia could join several flagship programs of the Modi government like the Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative envisioning joint initiatives in areas ranging from maritime security to maritime ecology to disaster risk reduction and management. It is up to Moscow whether it would be on the sidelines of the regional trends or would try to tap into potential for cooperation with friendly nations, including India.

Russia’s new status of a dialogue partner in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and its increasing presence in the region provide for more diplomatic and military interaction with India. Unfortunately, even though there are regular exercises held between navies of the two countries, their interaction remains insufficient. Unlike many other regional partners, Russia does not have a white shipping agreement with India and has not posted its liaison officer[10] at the Information Fusion Centre in Gurugram. As of now, it is clear that more could be done in order to bring the states’ political and maritime visions of the region together.

The remaining bottlenecks

The weakest point of relations with a dim outlook is the trade and economic cooperation. Despite the repeatedly expressed commitment to achieve $30bn trade volumes by 2025, this relatively modest target seems unreachable. Although the two states created the framework for a closer interaction in this sphere by establishing a Strategic Economic Dialogue and promoting several business fora, there is not much substance and depth in this domain. There is little hope for the potential signing of the free trade agreement between India and the Eurasian Economic Union and its effect on economic ties at large as after several years of studies and consultations the negotiations have yet to begin.

Some separate success stories of Russian IT and technological companies operating in India have not set the trend so far. Business elites of the two countries remain disconnected and primarily look for the opportunities elsewhere. The only exception is energy cooperation – a unique sphere where Indian and Russian companies continue to increase investments.

President Putin’s reference[11] in his opening remarks to the “green” agenda as a “very important” area for both nations was quite surprising. So far, the two countries have not discussed this issue in detail. Neither environmental problems, nor climate change were mentioned in the documents issued after the summit, demonstrating that this remains an unexplored topic of bilateral dialogue. Given the growing significance of climate change and energy transition at a global level, there is a room to navigate approaches between the two countries for them to exchange best practices of adhering to ecological standards.

The attention toward inter-regional cooperation is growing. After the 2019 Vladivostok summit, Indian companies have increased their interest in working across the Russian Far East with particular focus on logistics, resources, diamond processing and tourism. India’s commitment to cooperate in this region is underlined with the credit line of $1 billion for the development projects, although its operationalization has not been achieved so far.

The attempts to infuse new energy in economic ties are visible. The projects in railways, steel production, agriculture, petrochemicals, banking and insurance, and healthcare are being either explored or implemented. Inland waterways and civilian shipbuilding have been recognized as promising areas of collaboration. The amendment to Merchant Shipping Agreement (1994) allows for recognizing the seafarers’ identity documents and training them for joint polar expeditions and shipping in the Arctic.

However, as long as the economic dialogue is driven by the public sector and almost devoid of private initiatives, it will be developing at a snail’s pace and may remain limited in scope.

The large-scale summit indicated that it is too early to write off the Russia–India strategic partnership, which despite all ebbs and flows retains its viability amidst geopolitical flux. However, to achieve any long-lasting effect for the relationship the two countries should seek to smooth over disagreements in their geopolitical visions and hunt for the new drivers in their relations.

It may be argued that the two nations should take a clear-eyed review of the current state of their ties with an emphasis on intensifying dialogue in the new sectors. The strategic planning for the decade should include not only defence cooperation, but other areas of potential growth, which might emerge as pillars of partnership in the future.

         

                          Back to top